Defining Naturalism the Right Way

Correcting an error in how we understand naturalism

In a previous post, “What is Naturalism?”, I quoted William H Halverson’s A Concise Introduction to Philosophy, Fourth Edition, 1981 (Random House, NY). Today I want to return to Halverson and focus again on his presentation of naturalism as a world view. In doing so, I want to focus on a fundamental mistake in how naturalism has traditionally been presented.

In chapter 57, Halverson (writing “from the point of view of a convinced advocate of the view in question”) describes naturalism as claiming, “In the beginning, matter.” In contrast, he points out, supernaturalism claims, “In the beginning, God.” (I quoted this in “What is Naturalism?”)¹

More broadly (though Halverson doesn’t say this) supernaturalism states, “In the beginning, mind, consciousness or intelligence.” The most popular versions of the supernatural world view eagerly call this God, but this move isn’t universal.

The main takeaway: naturalism and supernaturalism are competing factual claims about the history of existence. Naturalism says, originally there was physical stuff and then living organisms evolved (on earth, at least), and then some living organisms evolved to have consciousness. (The publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species in the 19th century reinvigorated naturalism, because it demonstrated that the forms of species could have come about without the application of intelligence from outside.)

It also highlights a central element of naturalism: consciousness (consequently mind and intelligence) is something produced by the brains of organisms. Not produced necessarily by all organisms, but by those with an adequate collection of neurons (details to follow as scientists do their work.) Therefore, if naturalism is correct, consciousness was not around at the beginning but arrived on the scene later.

By default, this entails atheism. It means that God’s sort of existence, which is bodiless mind or consciousness, was not around in the beginning. Such is the heart of naturalism, and it’s why I write so much about it here. Naturalism really is preface to atheism.

In opposition, supernaturalism asserts that, yes, consciousness may have arrived in organisms like us later on, but this was possible only because an original Consciousness was present all along. Indeed, the original Consciousness created the physical world. In the beginning, God.

I want you to see the important of stating the difference between naturalism and supernaturalism in this way. It makes clear that the debate is over factual & historical claims. It is a debate over what happened when, as well as a debate over where consciousness is. Importantly, it’s a difference of opinion that can be adjudicated by examining evidence.

Bedeviled Naturalism

But Halverson’s presentation of naturalism in A Concise Introduction to Philosophy, in my opinion, has a fatal flaw; a mistake which bedevils advocates of naturalism to this day. And bedevil is the right word here. The flaw sneaks into naturalism a fundamental premise belonging to supernaturalism. It allows a supernatural devil (in the form of consciousness) to slither about in naturalism’s garden.

To see this, let’s look carefully at the relevant passages in his book:

“Naturalism asserts, first, that the primary constituents of reality are material entities. By this I do not mean that only material entities exist; I am not denying the reality—the real existence—of such things as hopes, plans, behavior, language, logical inferences, and so on. What I am asserting, however, is that anything that is real is, in the last analysis, explicable as a material entity or as a form or function or action of a material entity. Theism says, “In the beginning, God;” naturalism says, “In the beginning, matter.” If the theoretical goal of science—an absolutely exhaustive knowledge of the natural world—were to be achieved, there would remain no reality of any other kind about which we might still be ignorant. The “ultimate realities,” according to naturalism, are not the alleged objects of the inquiries of theologians; they are the entities that are the objects of investigation by chemists, physicists, and other scientists. To put the matter very simply: materialism is true.”²

Halverson’s naturalist next goes on to say that naturalism also holds “determinism is true” and that “to be is to be some place, some time.”

“Naturalism asserts, second, that what happens in the world is theoretically explicable without residue in terms of the internal structures and the external relations of these material entities. The world is, to use an inadequate metaphor, like a gigantic machine whose parts are so numerous and whose processes are so complex that we have, thus far, been able to achieve only a partial and fragmentary understanding of how it works. In principle, however, everything at occurs is ultimately explicable in terms of the properties and relations of the particles of which matter is composed. Once again, the point may be stated simply: determinism is true.”

“It follows from what I have said that the categories of space and time are categories of great importance of naturalism—are in fact, ontological categories. If you cannot locate something in space and time, or if you cannot understand it as a form or function of some entity or entities located in space and time, then you simply cannot say anything intelligible about it. To be is to be some place, some time.”³

In these passages, I have emphasized the word “explicable” for a reason. This is the devil I mentioned earlier.

Not Halverson’s Fault

The devil is not Halverson’s fault. He merely presents naturalism as 20th century advocates have commonly misunderstood it. For example, Britannica.com says,

“Naturalism presumes that nature is in principle completely knowable. There is in nature a regularity, unity, and wholeness that implies objective laws, without which the pursuit of scientific knowledge would be absurd.”⁴

There is so much wrong with this that one almost doesn’t know where to begin.

Let start at the end, the assumption that without “objective laws” that “the pursuit of scientific knowledge would be absurd.” Well, it’s a claim. Yet the pursuit of science is unaffected by this question of where scientific laws exist. Whether they exist “out there” in the external world or whether they exist “in here” in human consciousness, science progresses all the same.

The lack of “out there” existence for our scientific conclusions might seem “absurd” to someone committed to a supernatural world view, but in fact it’s quite sensible. Thoughts, conclusions, understandings are all “in here” phenomena. Like all aspect of consciousness, human knowledge exists to “stand in” for the external physical world. But stand in is all knowledge ever does. It does not and cannot become “factual” in the external world.

Let me repeat: our scientific understanding of matter and energy stands in for the external world around us. It is a careless mistake to conflate scientific understanding of the world for the nature of the world. If you commit this error, you’ve inserted an element of human consciousness which exist in here and placed it out there—you’ve conflated subjective reality with objective reality.

If we dig down, we discover that the underlying fault here is the unquestioned assumption that organisms perceive the world through their senses, and that any resulting knowledge is objective (i.e. an aspect of the external natural world) rather than subjective (i.e. an aspect of human consciousness). Since sense sensations and meaning sensations are aspects of consciousness, this inevitably entangles human consciousness with the physical world around us, vitiating naturalism by inserting consciousness where it does not exist.

We need to rescue the world view of naturalism from this bedevilment so that everyone benefits from clearer thinking (whether naturalist or supernaturalist).

Indeed, Britannica.com does the opposite, turning naturalism into nothing more than the meaningless declaration “everything is natural.”

“While naturalism has often been equated with materialism, it is much broader in scope. Materialism is indeed naturalistic, but the converse is not necessarily true. Strictly speaking, naturalism has no ontological preference; i.e., no bias toward any particular set of categories of reality: dualism and monism, atheism and theism, idealism and materialism are all per se compatible with it. So long as all of reality is natural, no other limitations are imposed. Naturalists have in fact expressed a wide variety of views, even to the point of developing a theistic naturalism.”⁵

This is worthless.⁶

Explicibility and Perception

Perhaps it’s viable to view the common but confused presentation of naturalism as one of several possible varieties which fall under the meta philosophy of naturalism—albeit deeply flawed. Fortunately, there are other variations under the meta philosophy, versions which excise explicability, thus restoring coherence, and also eliminating determinism (since determinism results from the desire for explicability “without residue”⁷).

We have sound biological & evolutionary reasons for excising explicability from being foundational. These include Hume’s observations about the problem of induction and of course, most importantly, Darwin’s On the Origin of Species⁸ which undoubtedly influenced William James’ ideas about pragmatism. These also include the rejection of scientific realism, which is necessitated by the biological understanding that species (including us, of course) have no actual method of perceiving⁹ the world. We are left with scientific pragmatism to replace scientific realism. (But these are topics for future Preface articles.)

Instead, let me continue to focus on the logical reason for removing explicability from the definition of naturalism.

Explicability commits naturalism to the proposition that organisms, through sensations and consciousness, can perceive the physical world as it is. This commitment to perception relies on the assumption that consciousness and the “outside” physical world are a two-way street. On one side of the street, neurons in the brain produce consciousness. (A necessary assumption for naturalism, and amply supported by the evidence we have.)

But on the other side of the street, somehow, consciousness interacts with the outside physical world which we are sensing, so that it can be “perceived.”

It would not be a problem if the assertion were that the two-way interaction occurs between consciousness and the brain: brain producing consciousness and consciousness modifying neurons in return. But the claim of explicability alters the nature of the two-way street: it asserts that consciousness, in its sensual form (i.e., the senses) is a perception of the outside world, and therefore an interaction with whatever physical stuff is.

But how can this be? Logically, it implies compatibility between the sensations of consciousness and the physical world. This is just plain mystical: in the end it means that the physical world (exclusive of neurons in the brain) must have a nature which interacts with and is compatible with consciousness.

If we accept this, we are no longer advocating naturalism or physicalism. So advocates of naturalism should reject this mess.

Instead, advocate of naturalism (thinking logically) should limit the interaction between consciousness and the physical world to the realm of the brain’s neurons: there alone is where interaction between matter and mind, stuff and sensation, “objective” and “subjective” occurs. The brain produces consciousness and consciousness in turn modifies the brain. Consciousness never exists outside this limited interaction. It’s a tool the brain uses to improve itself, and that is that.

Let me summarize my argument in a different form. Per Halverson, explicability asserts that human thoughts can tap into the actual “properties and relations of the particles of which matter is composed.” But this is based on the unnatural assumption that properties and relations can be found in the physical world.

But wait: properties and relations are the native language of consciousness. So explicability misleads us into asserting that the native language of consciousness is something that we can find in the physical world as we interact with it.

Such a position is not naturalism. It’s pan-psychism or supernaturalism.

Again, if interaction between elements of consciousness and the physical world is constrained to the brain and its neurons, it poses no problem for naturalism. But allow compatibility between consciousness and physical stuff to occur outside of neurons in the brain, and you’ve jumped out of naturalism into it’s negation.

You’ve allowed the devil into your natural garden.

1. William H. Halverson, A Concise Introduction to Philosophy, 4th Edition, New York, 1967-1981, Random House, page 424.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. https://www.britannica.com/topic/naturalism-philosophy

5. Ibid.

6. Interestingly, if you replace the word “naturalism” with “science” then the quote makes sense. Has Britannica equated science with “methodological naturalism” and forgotten that philosophical naturalism (the meta philosophy of naturalism) even exists?

7. More on this in future posts.

8. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Charles-Darwin/On-the-Origin-of-Species

9. In future posts I will outline the biological case against organisms perceiving the world around themselves. The concept of perception has been scientifically debunked, but most philosophers haven’t caught up yet.